At trial, the magazines, but not the $50 bill, were introduced into evidence. 21 The jury found Macon guilty of distributing obscene materials.
2
Macon appealed, contending that a prior judicial determination of probable cause was required to sustain a seizure of the magazines and to arrest him on obscenity related charges. 23 The Maryland Court of Special Appeals determined that the purchase of the magazines was a constructive seizure in contravention of fourth amendment protections, and that the proper remedy was to exclude the magazines from evidence at trial.24 The court also held, in the alternative, that the warrantless arrest of Macon required the exclusion of the publications from evidence. 2 5 Accordingly, the court reversed the conviction and ordered that the charges against Macon be dismissed, because without the magazines there was insufficient evidence to sustain the conviction. 26 The Maryland Court of Special Appeals began its analysis by stating: "The need to protect first amendment rights from government suppression necessitates more stringent application of fourth amendment safeguards in obscenity cases than in criminal cases. ' '2 7 The court recognized that the warrant requirement is primary among these safeguards because the protection of first amendment freedoms cannot be relegated to the whim of a law enforcement ofwithin the meaning of the fourth amendment and that the warrantless arrest was lawful. Id. 21 Id. 22 Id. 23 Id. Macon did not challenge the jury's finding that the magazines were obscene. Id. at 2780-81. 24 Macon, 57 Md. App. at 717-19, 471 A.2d at 1096. The Supreme Court noted that by holding that the purchase constituted a seizure, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals rejected the view taken by a majority of states-that a purchase by an undercover police officer is not a seizure, regardless of whether the funds used to make the purchase are later retrieved as evidence. ficer. 2 8 The court concluded: "Thus, consideration of first amendment rights necessitates obtention of a judicial warrant as a precondition to seizure of allegedly obscene materials. '2 9 The Maryland Court of Special Appeals then stated that similar reasoning applied to the seizure of a person allegedly involved in the distribution of such materials. 30 As a result, the court explained that the prerequisite to a seizure of the person, as well as the allegedly obscene matter he distributes, is a prior judicial probable cause determination that the matter is obscene.
3 '
The court then addressed the state's contention that the magazines were purchased, and not seized. 32 The court stated that viewing the occurrence as a purchase would unjustifiedly circumvent first amendment protections. 3 3 It explained: "To permit the police, 
(1973)). The Court also stated:
The complexity of the test for obscenity, and the need to ensure that constitutionally protected speech is not discouraged, require that the probable cause determination of obscenity be entrusted not to the police officer, who may lack legal expertise or impartiality, but to the judicial officer, whose knowledge of the law, coupled with his neutrality and detachment, qualify him to make such a decision. Id. at 718, 471 A.2d at 1092-93.
29 Macon, 57 Md. App. at 712, 471 A.2d at 1093. However, the court noted:
The Court established one exception to the warrant requirement, when police are faced with a "now or never" situation in which they must seize the allegedly obscene material or its distributor instantly or lose the opportunity ....
There is nothing in the record to indicate that [Macon] or the magazines would not have been subject to seizure after the time required to have a neutral magistrate review the material and make a probable cause determination of obscenity.
The hearing to obtain a warrant need only be exparte, not adversarial.... [The Supreme Court] did not perceive that an adversary hearing would protect first amendment rights significantly better than an exparte proceeding.... For the same reasoning, an adversarial hearing is not a necessary precondition to issuance of a warrant to arrest the alleged purveyors of obscene material ....
An exparte hearing will suffice. A review of the record convinces us that every aspect of the missions in search of pornography and its purveyors was prearranged, including the repossession of the money given in 'payment' for the evidence. Yet, an element essential to the validity of the seizures, judicial concurrence regarding the obscene nature of the evidence, was missing. And the failure to seek the judge's opinion ... could not have been inadvertent. Viewing the transactions in their entirety, we also believe they were 'preconceived seizures,' designed in part to evade that phase of the warrant procedure whose specific purpose is the protection of first amendment freedoms.
What is particularly objectionable here is that the alleged purchase ... was immediately followed by a warrantless arrest and the seizure of the money .... Such [Vol. 76 as a rule, to follow the practice used in this case would elevate form over substance, effectively sanctioning an 'end run' around these safeguards." 3 4
The Maryland Court of Special Appeals held that the proper remedy for the warrantless seizure was to exclude the magazines from trial. 3 5 The court recognized that warrantless arrests do not bar prosecution. 3 6 The court also stated that the general rule, which is almost unanimously followed in state and federal courts, is that an illegal arrest does not negate subsequent conviction.
7
The court explained, alternatively, that Macon's unconstitutional arrest furnished an additional basis for excluding the magazines. 3 8 It recognized that the first amendment prohibits the suppression of free expression even when published materials are not seized in violation of the fourth amendment. 3 9 Because the arrest forced Macon to close the bookstore, it was substantially more repressive than the simple seizure of the two magazines, for it barred public access as effectively as a seizure of all the store's publications. 40 Hence, the court held that where "law enforcement officers arrest a suspected distributor of obscene matter without a warrant authorizing seizure of either the distributor or the matter, the proper remedy is to exclude evidence of the allegedly obscene matter acquired in connection with the arrest." 4 1 a transaction, in our opinion, could not have been a purchase; there was no intent to part with the money as in an ordinary sale.... [It] was tantamount to a warrantless seizure ....
[F]irst amendment considerations militate against the approval of transactions expressly designed to evade specific warrant requirements governing the seizure of material arguably subject to constitutional protection.... An aspect of the warrant procedure tailored to protect first amendment freedoms could not have been meant for easy evasion with the modicum of ingenuity. In a seven to two decision, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Maryland Court of Special Appeals. 4 3 With Justice O'Connor writing for the majority, 4 4 the Court held that the Maryland Court of Special Appeals erred in viewing the purchase of the two allegedly obscene magazines as a "constructive seizure" and in deciding that the magazines should not have been admitted into evidence at trial. 4 5 The Court held that because the officers did not obtain possession of the magazines by means of an unreasonable search or seizure, and because the magazines were not the fruit of an arrest, lawful or otherwise, the magazines were properly admitted into evidence at trial. The issue the majority addressed was whether a purchase of allegedly obscene matter by an undercover police officer constitutes a seizure under the fourth amendment. 
POLICE PURCHASES AND SEIZURES
Amendment violation, exclusion is unwarranted." 48 The Court analyzed the first prong of its test by determining whether the purchase constituted a search or seizure. First, the Court explained that a search occurs when "'an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to consider reasonable is infringed.' 49 The Court relied on Katz v. United States, 50 in which it held that "[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public.., is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection." 5 1 The Court recognized that Macon did not have any reasonable expectation of privacy in the bookstore because the general public was invited to enter and to transact business therein. 52 The majority concluded: "The officer's action in entering the bookstore and examining the wares that were intentionally exposed to all who frequent the place of business did not infringe a legitimate expectation of privacy and hence did not constitute a search .. . Second, the Court explained that a seizure occurs when" 'there is some meaningful interference with an individual's possessory interests' in the property seizured. ' 54 The Court noted that Macon voluntarily transferred any possessory interest he may have had in the magazines to the police officer upon the receipt of the purchase money. 55 The Court concluded that at the time of the sale, the police officer did not interfere with any interest of the seller; he merely took that which was intended as a requisite part of the transaction. The mere expectation that the possibly illegal nature of a product will not come to the attention of the authorities, whether because a customer will not complain or because undercover officers will not transact business with the store, is not one that society is prepared to recognize as rea- 113 (1984) ). 55 Id. The Court further noted that whatever possessory interests Macon had was not in the magazines, but in the purchase money. Id.
56 Id. The Court also dismissed any assertion that the use of undercover officers is a per se violation of the first or fourth amendments. Id. at 2782-83. First, the Fourth Amendment is not violated when an undercover officer merely accepts an offer to do business which is freely made to the public. See id. at 2782. The Court said: "'A government agent, in the same manner as a private person, may accept an invitation to do business and may enter upon the premises for the very purposes contemplated by the occupant.'" Id. at 2782-83 (quoting Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 211 (1966)). Second, the purchase by an undercover officer of a small number of magazines does not
The Court then addressed the respondent's contention that the bona fide nature of the purchase was invalidated due to the officer's subsequent seizure of the marked $50 bill and failure to return the change. 57 The Court answered that from an objective perspective, the transaction was a sale. 58 It stated: "Whether a Fourth Amendment violation has occurred 'turns on an objective assessment of the officer's actions' . . . and not on the officer's actual state of mind at the time the challenged action was taken." 5 9
The Court in Macon therefore held that the actions of the police officer leading up to the transaction, and the actual transaction itself, were not a search or seizure. 60 As a result, the magazines did not have to be excluded from evidence at trial on the basis of an unreasonable search or seizure violation.
The Court then analyzed the second prong of its test to determine whether the magazines were the fruit of an unlawful arrest.
6 '
Relying on the exclusionary rule, the Court held that the " 'rule enjoins the Government from benefiting from evidence it has unlawfully obtained; it does not reach backward to taint information that was in official hands prior to any illegality.' "62 The Court concluded that the magazines were already in police possession before the arrest, and thus were not fruits of the arrest and not subject to )). The Court, in dicta, furthered explained: "Assuming, arguendo, that the retrieval of the money incident to the arrest was wrongful, the proper remedy is restitution or suppression of the $50 bill as evidence of the purchase, not exclusion from evidence of the previously purchased magazines." Id. 60 Id. The Court stated its conclusion as follows: "[W]e conclude that the officer's entry into the bookstore and later examination of materials offered for sale there was not a search and that the purchase of two magazines did not effect a seizure. the exclusionary rule. 63 In addition, the Court stated that the $50 bill, which was used to buy the obscene magazines, was the only fruit of the arrest.6 Exercise of the exclusionary rule was not necessary because the $50 bill was not introduced into evidence. The Court concluded, therefore, that the magazines were properly admitted in evidence. In his dissenting opinion, 68 Justice Brennan took issue with the majority opinion in two respects. First, Justice Brennan viewed the statute 6 9 under which the respondent was convicted as "unconstitutionally overbroad and therefore facially invalid in its entirety. 70 Second, Justice Brennan contended that even if he thought otherwise regarding the constitutionality of the statute, he would not join the majority opinion because he disagreed with the Court's analysis of whether the respondent's warrantless arrest should result in a reversal of his conviction. tance of the first amendment and liberty of expression. He stated that "in enforcing the Fourth Amendment's command, courts must exercise a 'scrupulous exactitude' to ensure that official use of the power to search and seize poses no threat to liberty of expression." 7 2 He continued by explaining that a seizure of presumptively protected books is not reasonable within the meaning of the fourth amendment without first obtaining a judicially issued warrant.
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Justice Brennan then contended that it logically follows that the seizure of a person for allegedly distributing allegedly obscene books and magazines must also meet the judicially issued warrant requirement. 7 4 He argued that if the investigative practice followed in this case were permitted, it would "threaten to restrain the liberty of expression in the same way that seizure of presumptively protected material does." '7 5 Justice Brennan noted "the disruptive potential of an effectively unbound power to arrest," 7 6 and stated that Roaden v. Kentucky makes clear that government officials may not seize persons or books and magazines without some prior judicial determination of probable cause. 77 Justice Brennan concluded that the warrantless arrest in this case was "clearly illegal." 7 8
Justice Brennan also argued that the Court left the respondent "without an effective remedy for his illegal arrest." 7 9 He noted that the Court followed precedents which hold that "the illegality of an arrest in itself will not suffice to prevent the introduction of evidence lawfully obtained prior to arrest, 8 0 ... or to invalidate a con- Justice Brennan concluded that the deterrent to protected expression which would result from such a system demands an effective remedy. 8 5 The remedy posited by Justice Brennan was the invalidation of obscenity convictions which are founded upon arrests unsupported by any prior judicial determination of probable cause. 
IV. FOURTH AMENDMENT PRINCIPLES AND DOCTRINE
The importance of the fourth amendment cannot be underestimated. 8 7 It is primarily through the fourth amendment that we as a society can govern our police, instead of our police governing us. [T]he consequences of illegal use of the power of arrest fall not only upon the specific victims of abuse of that power but also upon all those who, for fear of being subjected to official harrassment, steer far wider of the forbidden zone than they otherwise would. Such a result would infringe not only the rights of those who would otherwise engage in such expression but also the rights of those who would otherwise receive such expression.
Id.

See id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
86 See id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan declared: "Opting for the contrary course, the Court today sanctions an end around constitutional requirements carefully crafted to guard our liberty of expression." Id.
87 As Anthony G. Amsterdam, Professor of Law at New York University School of Law, states: "I can think of few constitutional issues more important than defining the reach of the fourth amendment-the extent to which it controls the array of activities of the police... [ As such, it is a "profoundly antigovernment document." 8 9 "A paramount purpose of the fourth amendment is to prohibit arbitrary searches and seizures as well as unjustified searches and seizures." 90 The framers of the Bill of Rights drafted the fourth amendment primarily to secure people from searches and seizures by officers acting with the unrestricted authority of a general warrant. 9 1 These general warrants placed "'the liberty of every man in the hands of every petty officer.' "92
While the fourth amendment was most directly the product of contemporary hatred against a system of writs of assistance, its roots go much deeper. 93 While occasionally specific, the warrants which were utilized more often than not gave the most general discretionary authority. 94 As a result, general warrants were ultimately judicially condemned in England. 95 This history is a component of the intellectual matrix within which the Bill of Rights' fabric was shaped. to identify the areas of concern, keep the concerns alive, set at least the minimum standards for each area, and provoke, inform and monitor the processes of enforcement in each area where we want to govern our police instead of being governed by them. 91 See Stanford, 379 U.S. at 480-85. The Court described the attitude of that era as follows:
Vivid in the memory of the newly independent Americans were those general warrants known as writs of assistance under which officers of the Crown had so bedeviled the colonists. The hated writs of assistance had given customs officials blanket authority to search where they pleased .... They were denounced by James Otis as "the worst instrument of arbitrary power, the most destructive of English liberty ...... Id. at 481. 93 See id. at 482. These roots were based upon the "use of general warrants as instruments of oppression from the time of the Tudors, through the Star Chamber, the Long Parliament, the Restoration, and beyond." Id. The Bill of Rights was fashioned against the background of knowledge that unrestricted power of search and seizure could also be an instrument for stifling liberty of expression. For the serious hazard of suppression of innocent expression inhered in the discretion confided in the officers authorized to exercise the power.
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Current fourth amendment doctrines are based on the principle that searches and seizures are forbidden by the fourth amendment only if they are unreasonable. 97 In 1950, the Supreme Court took a broad view of the phrase unreasonable searches and seizures; however, during the past twenty years, the Court has uniformly condemned searches and seizures made without a search warrant, subject only to a few narrow exceptions. 98 Search warrants may be issued only by judicial officers, upon a showing of probable cause; that is, "reasonable grounds to believe-that criminally related objects are in the place which the warrant authorizes to be searched and the items or matters to be seized." 9 9 An -officer may not seize anything that is not described in the search warrant except contraband and perhaps other obvious criminal objects which he inadvertantly encounters in plain view. 10 0 Exceptions to the warrant requirement include 1) consent searches, 2) a very limited class of routine searches, and 3) certain searches conducted under circumstances of haste which make it impracticable to obtain a search warrant.' 0 '
When first amendment rights are implicated, the constitutional requirement "that warrants must particularly describe the 'things to be seized' is to be accorded the most scrupulous exactitude. [T] he line between speech unconditionally guaranteed and speech which may be regulated, suppressed, or punished is finely drawn.... The separation of legitimate from illegitimate speech calls for.., sensitive tools .... It follows that, under the Fourteenth Amendment, a State is not free to adopt whatever procedures it pleases for dealing with obscenity.., without regard to possible consequences for constitutionally protected speech.1 0 4
However, notwithstanding these well-established fourth amendment principles and precedents, if police activities are not searches or seizures, the fourth amendment proscriptions do not apply.' 0 5
V. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS
In holding that a purchase of allegedly obscene magazines by an undercover police officer does not constitute a seizure under the fourth amendment, the Supreme Court in Macon reached a decision which is supported by precedents in the areas of both first amendment obscenity and fourth amendment search and seizure. Indeed, the Court's view of the purchase as simply that-a purchase-is reasonable and logical.1 0 6 It avoided the impracticable result of requiring a police officer to obtain a warrant before he can make a simple purchase. Initially, it is important to note the narrowness of the Court's inquiry. The Court focused on the police officer's actions in the bookstore leading up to the purchase of the two magazines and the actual purchase of the magazines.' 0 7 It did not consider whether the fourth amendment prohibited the subsequent warrantless arrest, leaving that question open, because the magazines at issue were not the product of the warrantless arrest.' 0 8
With respect to the scope of the term "search," courts have recwarrant be obtained prior to any search or seizure assures a free society that the sensitive determination of obscenity will be made judicially and not ad hoc by police officers in the field." Id.
104 Marcus, 367 U.S. at 736. 105 See United States v. Dionisio, 418 U.S. 1, 15 (1973). Professor Amsterdam described this fourth amendment applicability-nonapplicability framework as follows:
The fourth amendment, then, is ordinarily treated as a monolith: wherever it restricts police activities at all, it subjects them to the same extensive retrictions that it imposes upon physical entries into dwellings. To label any police activity a "search" or "seizure" within the ambit of the amendment is to impose those restrictions upon it. On the other hand, if it is not labeled a "search" or "seizure," it is subject to no restrictions of any kind. It is only "searches" or "seizures" that the fourth amendment requires to be reasonable: police activities of any other sort may be as unreasonable as the police please to make them. Amsterdam, supra note 87, at 388. 
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[Vol. 76 ognized that not all quests for evidence are searches within the meaning of the fourth amendment. 10 9 Instead, as the Court in Katz v. United States 11 0 explained, the formula of fourth amendment coverage is that whenever an individual may have a reasonable expectadon of privacy, he is entitled to be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion."' The term "expectation of privacy" was defined by Justice Harlan in his concurrence in Katz. He stated that "there is a twofold requirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable. 
389 U.S. 347 (1967).
111 See id. at 351-52. Professor Amsterdam pointed out that " 'Searches' are not particular methods by which government invades constitutionally protected interests: they are a description of the conclusion that such interests have been invaded." Amsterdam, supra note 87, at 385. Professor Amsterdam also noted: "In the end, the basis of the Katz decision seems to be that the fourth amendment protects those interests that may justifiably claim fourth amendment protection." Id.
112 Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan,J., concurring). Justice Harlan's elaboration of what he understood the majority's opinion to mean is set forth:
As the Court's opinion states, "the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places." The question, however, is what protection it affords to those people.... My understanding of the rule... is that there is a twofold requirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as "reasonable." Thus, a man's home is, for most purposes, a place where he expects privacy, but objects, activities, or statements that he exposes to the "plain view" of outsiders are not "protected" because no intention to keep them to himself has been exhibited. Once a police officer has entered the commercial premises in the same manner as would any other member of the public, the officer's actions do not constitute a search if he conducts himself as might be expected of any other person entering the premises. 118 He may examine merchandise as would a prospective customer, 119 and " 'take note of objects in plain view.'"120 However, if the officer goes beyond the limits of what a potential customer could be expected to do, his conduct may constitute a search. 12 1 As the Court in Lewis v. United States 122 cautioned: "[T]his does not mean that, whenever entry is obtained by invitation and the locus is characterized as a place of business, an agent is authorized to conduct a general search for incriminating materials."' 23 Consequently, warrantless wholesale searches and seizures generally do not comport with fourth amendment guarantees.' 24 When the police officer in Macon entered the bookstore, browsed a few minutes, and finally purchased the two magazines, he conducted himself as any reasonable customer would.' 2 5 He was not conducting a wholesale search,' 2 6 or any type of search whatsoever.' 2 7 In sum, the police officer was not infringing on any legitimate, reasonable expectation of privacy, and was therefore not subject to any fourth amendment prohibitions.
It is important to note the distinction between a seizure and a sale. Justice searched an adult bookstore during business hours. The Justice examined magazines after the officers removed the cellophane wrappers within which they were enclosed. Id. at 322-23. The Justice also looked at films on coin-operated projectors after the sales clerk adjusted the projector so that no coins were required. Id. The Court concluded that the search could not be upheld under the search warrant held by the officers. Id. at 325-26. In addressing the state's contention that no warrant was needed because the salesclerk had "no legitimate expectation of privacy against governmental intrusion," the Court said:
[TMhere is no basis for the notion that because a retail store invites the public to enter, it consents to wholesale searches and seizures that do not conform to Fourth Amendment guarantees.... The Town Justice viewed the films, not as a customer, but without the payment a member of the public would be required to make. plated, and in fact intended, by the seller as a necessary part of the transaction. 13 2 Hence, the Court in Macon rightly held that the purchase of two magazines by an undercover officer was not a seizure.
However, the respondent asserted that the entire transaction was a preconceived seizure. 1 33 The preconceived seizure theory maintains that police officers do not actually intend to part with the purchase money, 134 and that therefore the transaction is not a bonafide purchase, but a "preconceived seizure" designed to evade the procedural safeguard of obtaining a warrant.
13 5
The difficulty with the "preconceived seizure" theory is that it delves into the subjective. 136 In contrast, an objective standard is the test which has been selected and continuously utilized by the Court to determine if there has been a fourth amendment violation. For the most part.., the constitutional rules governing searches and seizures allow, withhold or limit the search power upon the basis of entirely objective criteria. When objective circumstances authorizing an exercise of that power exist, a policeman may exercise it within objectively defined limits; and courts will not ordinarily inquire whether it exercise was actuated by the right or wrong motives.
Id.
137 See supra note 136 and accompanying text. 138 436 U.S. 128 (1977) . 139 Id. at 137. In Tery v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1968), the Supreme Court first noted that the fourth amendment prohibits only "unreasonable" searches and seizures, and then emphasized the objective nature of the term "reasonable."
The scheme of the Fourth Amendment becomes meaningful only when it is assured that at some point the conduct of those charged with enforcing the laws can be subjected to the more detached, neutral scrutiny of a judge who must evaluate the reasonableness of a particular search or seizure in light of the particular circumstances. And in making that assessment it is imperative that the facts be judged against an objective standard. Id at 21. view, cautioning that to send "state and federal courts on an expedition into the minds of police officers would produce a grave and fruitless misallocation of judicial resources."' 40 In sum, as the Court in Scott maintained, "the fact that the officer does not have the state of mind which is hypothecated by the reasons which provide the legal justification for the officer's action does not invalidate the action taken as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that action." 14 1 Viewed objectively, the purchase of a magazine by an undercover officer is simply that-a purchase-regardless of any subjective intent the officer may have entertained.1 42 As a result, the transaction is not a seizure, and thus not subject to fourth amendment proscriptions.1 43 Furthermore, the simple browsing and eventual purchase of a few magazines in a bookstore cannot be characterized as a wholesale search or seizure so as to subject these actions to fourth amendment scrutiny. Permitting this conduct does not result in a risk of prior restraint.' 44 More specifically, the purchase of a few magazines does not harm the seller,' 45 nor does it harm potential buyers or the general public. ' 4 6 The seller is not deprived of the ability to effectuate a sale, 1 4 7 and potential buyers and the general public are not deprived of the opportunity to purchase additional copies of the same magazines. 14 8 Hence, the purchase neither creates a risk of prior restraint, nor can it be termed a wholesale search and seizure; as a result, it is not subject to fourth amendment proscriptions.
The purchase by the undercover agent in the instant case is indistinguishable from the purchase of other illegal substances previously found not to violate the fourth amendment. 1 4 9 As the Court in Lewis noted, if such undercover activities were illegal per se, this proscription would "severely hamper the Government in ferreting out those organized criminal activities that are characterized by covert dealings with victims who either cannot or do not protest."' 50 In addition, as Justice Brennan explained in his concurring opinion in Lewis, such activity invades no right to privacy of the seller. 15 1 Consequently, the activity is not a search or seizure.
The most prominent examples of these "secret" crimes include the illegal sales of liquors, narcotics, firearms, bribery, and prostitution.' 52 These enumerated criminal categories are established under regulatory statutes which condemn behavior directed against public order, and not particular individuals.' 5 3 Violation is deemed a wrong against society and not against a specific individual.' 54 These offenses are carried out in "secret," and it is rare for any member of the public to be willing to assist in the enforcement of the law.' 5 5 It is necessary therefore that the government rely upon
